

28 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CABELL

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Intentions

1. The Board discussed the morning's items of news about Communist China, and concluded about as follows:

(a) Renewal of bombardment of Quemoy on a scale of last summer is unlikely because the Chicoms will not want another loss of face;

(b) A bigger Chicom attack in the Strait is even more unlikely because (among other things) the Soviets will not want it now. If it occurs, however, we shall certainly have to change our ideas about Sino-Soviet relations;

(c) Ladakh and Northeastern Frontier incidents are probably no more than incidents arising perhaps out of Chicom operations in Tibet. They are probably not the beginning of bigger Chicom adventures. But India's view of Communist China is in process of change, as evidenced by Nehru's publicizing these incidents which in earlier days he would probably have ignored.

(d) Laos is not a matter of deep concern to the Chicoms -- at least not yet.

2. Our fairly comfortable view of present Chicom intentions, as set forth above, is disturbed by our conviction that the Chicoms do not like the Khrushchev-Eisenhower


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talks, and probably want to remind both the US and the USSR of Chicom right to be considered in world affairs. This may produce further disturbing actions by the Chicom, though not, we think, actions involving much risk to them. It was suggested that there might be an incident on the Chinese-Burmese frontier.

ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
Board of National Estimates

copy to: DDI

*Note - An experiment in informal communication.
I do not know if it is worth doing*



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
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